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Abstract
We analyse the equilibrium consequences of performance-based contracts for fund
managers. Managerial remuneration is tied to a fund’s absolute performance and
its performance relative to rival funds. Investors choose whether or not to delegate
their investment to better-informed fund managers; if they delegate they choose
the parameters of the optimal contract subject to the fund manager’s participation
constraint. We find that the impact of relative performance evaluation on the
equilibrium equity premium and on portfolio herding critically depends on whether
the participation constraint is binding. Simple numerical examples suggest that the
increased importance of delegation and relative performance evaluation may lower
the equity premium.
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JEL Classification: G11, G12, G23.
1. Introduction
The explosive growth of the asset management industry during the 1990s1 was ac-
companied by a growing trend towards performance-based remuneration for fund
managers. Given that stock markets performed rather well over this period, the
absolute return on a managed fund was not a reliable measure of managerial abil-
ity. In this environment, remunerating fund managers on the basis of their relative
performance became increasingly attractive. Other things being equal, a fund man-
ager should be paid more if he ‘beats the market’ or performs better than his peers.
Contracts based on relative performance evaluation (RPE) provide incentives for
managers to perform well, while stripping away the uncertainty common to all
investment funds.
While there is a substantial literature on the impact of performance-based con-
tracts on portfolio choice,2 their implication for asset market equilibrium is poorly
understood. In this paper we aim to analyze the equilibrium consequences of
performance-based contracts in a simple model of portfolio choice. We consider a
two-period model in which investors allocate their wealth across two assets: risk-
less bonds and risky equity shares. An investor can invest directly in these assets
or delegate the portfolio choice to a professional fund manager. Delegation incurs
fees, so is rational only if its benefits justify the costs. In our model, fund managers
have access to better information about the relative returns of the two assets. If
investors opt to delegate, they choose the optimal performance-based fee structures
to remunerate fund managers. We allow managerial remuneration to be a linear
function of their absolute and relative performances, and to include a fixed com-
ponent that is independent of performance. Both classes of agents – investors and
fund managers – are assumed to be risk-averse. Investors choose their investment
strategy to maximize the expected utility of their returns net of any delegation
fees. Fund managers choose portfolios to maximize the expected utility of their
remuneration. Our interest lies in analyzing the equilibrium outcome, where asset
1Mamaysky and Spiegel (2001) report that the number of equity funds registered in the US
rose from 785 in 1990 to 11,882 by 2000, while total net assets under management in equity funds
grew from $296 billion to $5.81 trillion by 2000, an almost twenty-fold increase. By comparison,
over the same period, the number of equities listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ grew
from 6,635 to 8,435, an increase of 27%.
2See, e.g., Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1985), Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Das and Sun-
daram (2002), Maug and Naik (1996), Admati and Pfleiderer (1997), and Bhattacharya (1999).
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prices are determined through market clearing.
We find that fund managers’ portfolio choices typically undo the incentive ef-
fects of relative performance evaluation in linear contracts. If so, does relative
performance evaluation matter? In our model delegating investors choose delega-
tion contracts to provide the right incentives to fund managers, subject to a stan-
dard participation constraint. If delegating investors can choose the parameters of
the linear contract optimally, relative performance evaluation serves a limited pur-
pose. While the use of RPE contracts is not sub-optimal for investors it does not
necessarily improve on outcomes obtained through other contracts based on abso-
lute performance alone. However, in reality the set of feasible contracts may be
somewhat restricted. Consider, for instance, a plausible requirement that the fixed
component of managerial remuneration cannot be negative. When this restriction
poses a binding constraint, so that the chosen contract is only constrained-optimal,
relative performance evaluation matters. With constrained-optimal contracts, the
weight placed on RPE affects the demand of risky assets in delegated portfolios
and hence the equilibrium equity premium. These effects are driven by equilibrium
conditions and could not be uncovered outside the type of model we analyse here.
We also find that, even with ‘fully-optimal’ linear contracts, delegated port-
folios are likely to have larger demand for the risky asset than if investors were
to invest directly. There are two reasons for this. One, performance-based dele-
gation contracts entail risk sharing between investors and fund managers: to the
extent delegating investors bear only a part of the risk associated with a portfolio
holding, they are willing to let their delegated portfolios carry higher levels of the
risky asset than if they were investing directly. Two, if fund managers are better
informed than direct investors, their informational advantage lowers the risk asso-
ciated with any given level of holdings of the risky asset. If delegation results in
greater willingness to hold risky assets, it is quite plausible that greater reliance on
delegated investment will lower the required equilibrium risk premium. Empirical
evidence has suggested that the equity risk premium has declined in recent years:3
the processes described in this paper offer channels of contributory influence. We
present illustrative examples quantifying some of these effects in our model.
To keep the model as intuitive as possible we make a number of simplifying
assumptions. We assume that all fund managers have access to the same (common)
3See, for example, Claus and Thomas (2001), Graham and Harvey (2001) and Welch (2000).
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information signal that is correlated with the true future value of the risky asset.
This corresponds to a setting where some market specialists (fund managers) have
better information than outsiders (private or direct investors). This assumption
can readily be relaxed to allow fund managers to have private and heterogeneous
information – reflecting, for instance, stock picking or market timing skills – but
this complicates the algebra without altering our conclusions. We also assume in
the main analysis that fund managers have no wealth of their own, but relax this
assumption in Section 5.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin with a brief survey of the related
literature. Sections 2 to 4 describe our model and our principal findings regarding
portfolio choices and the delegation decision. Section 5 studies the resulting equi-
libria, including the implication for the equity premium. Section 6 concludes. All
proofs are collected in the Appendix.
1.1. Related literature
Relative performance evaluation has long been an aspect of contractual relations.
Even when it is not explicitly written into a contract, RPE may be a part of
the implicit agreements that guide long-term remuneration. Gibbons and Murphy
(1990) found that upward revision of CEO salaries tends to be positively related to
firms’ performance, but negatively related to industry or market performance as a
whole. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1992) found positive correlation between
the relative performance of funds (as indicated by their rank in published league
tables) and inflow of new investment funds. Similarly, Chevalier and Ellison (1997)
and Sirri and Tufano (1998) found a positive, if nonlinear, relationship between
performance and inflow of new funds to mutual funds. Given that management
fees are an increasing function of the size of managed funds, outperforming the
market leads to higher rewards in the future.
Holmstrom (1982) was among the first to argue that relative performance eval-
uation (RPE) is valuable if agents face some common uncertainty. To be precise,
RPE is useful if other agents’ performance reveals information about an agent’s
unobservable choices that cannot be inferred from his own measured performance.
Of course, RPE-based contracts do not always work in the interest of the principals.
Within organizations, basing reward on relative performance creates incentives to
sabotage the measured performance of co-workers, to collude with co-workers, or to
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self-select into a pool of low ability workers. Dye (1992) pointed out such contracts
may distort choice by persuading managers to select projects where their relative
talent, rather than their absolute talent, is the greatest. Aggarwal and Samwick
(1999) show that when firms compete in product markets, use of high-powered
incentives may result in excessive competition: the need to soften the intensity of
competition may induce principals to dilute incentives. And, even when the net
benefit of RPE contracts is positive, they may be difficult to implement, say, if
individual performance (as opposed to team performance) is hard to measure.
Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer’s (1985) seminal paper on delegated portfolio man-
agement has been followed by an extensive literature on the impact of the dele-
gation fee structure on portfolio choice. Grinblatt and Titman (1989) and Das
and Sundaram (2002) focus on the differences between symmetric, ‘fulcrum’ con-
tracts (which penalise under-performance just as they reward out-performance),
and asymmetric, ‘incentive’ contracts (which reward out-performance without pe-
nalising under-performance). Our model focuses on symmetric contracts. Das and
Sundaram (1998) point out that symmetric contracts have long been mandatory
for US mutual funds, though regulatory exemptions have diluted this requirement
to some extent. Indeed, in our model managerial remuneration is a linear function
of the performance measures. While linear contracts are commonly observed in the
fund management industry, they may not always be the optimal class of contracts.
See Diamond (1998), among others, for a discussion of this issue.
Brennan (1993) provides an early attempt to study the general equilibrium
implications of contracts that reward managers according to their performance
relative to a benchmark portfolio. In that spirit, Cuoco and Kaniel (2001) examine
the impact of such RPE contracts on equilibrium prices. As in our model, they have
three classes of agents (‘active investors’, ‘fund investors’ and ‘fund managers’), but
the proportions of the three classes are fixed exogenously. Their primary purpose is
to compare the impact of symmetric versus asymmetric RPE contracts: they find
that symmetric contracts tilt portfolio choice towards stocks that are part of the
benchmark, while asymmetric contracts lead fund managers to choose portfolios
that maximise the variance of their excess return over the benchmark. These papers
do not consider the choice of optimal contract parameters.
Admati and Pfleiderer (1997) do look at the issue of optimal contract param-
eters in such contexts. They question the usefulness of benchmark-adjusted com-
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pensation: they find that such schemes are generally inconsistent with optimal
risk sharing or with the goal of obtaining the optimal portfolio for the delegating
investor. Our model differs from theirs in some crucial, and significant, respects.
In their model, the decision to delegate is taken as given. Further, the expected
return to assets is given exogenously (i.e., they do not allow for the possibility
that investment choices made by fund managers affect the equilibrium return dis-
tribution). Three, in their model, relative performance is measured relative to a
“passive” benchmark, such as a stock market index. Indeed, Admati and Pfleiderer
themselves highlight these limitations of their model, and make the case for a model
along the lines we present here. In our model, the benchmark is the average return
of active fund managers, and thus is endogenous. We consider the equilibrium out-
come, where relative returns are determined endogenously. We find that relative
performance evaluation has a more benign effect, in that it is not incompatible
with optimal portfolio selection.
2. The Model
2.1. Preferences and delegation
To isolate the effects of performance-based contracts on the asset market equilib-
rium, we study a simple two-period model of portfolio choice. Time is denoted by
t = 0, 1. There are N investors, each with initial wealth of one unit. An investor
can invest his wealth directly or delegate the investment decision to a fund man-
ager. The delegation decision is endogenous. Suppose n ≤ N investors choose to
delegate their investment (we denote these as i = 1, 2, . . . , n), while the remaining
N − n investors invest directly. We assume, for simplicity, that each delegating
investor is matched with exactly one fund manager, so that there are as many fund
managers as there are delegating investors. We also assume, for the moment, that
managers have no investible resources of their own, nor can they borrow to invest.
All agents – investors and fund managers – are risk averse and make choices in
order to maximise the expected utility of their returns. In our model the struc-
ture of asset returns and payoffs are such that individual returns are normally
distributed. We assume that all agents have utility functions with constant ab-
solute risk aversion, possibly with different degrees of risk aversion. Under these
assumptions, expected utility depends on the mean and variance of an agent’s
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payoff. Given random payoff w˜, agent j’s utility is given as
Vj(w˜) = E(w˜)− ρj
2
V ar(w˜), (1)
where ρj > 0 is the individual’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
Agents allocate their wealth across two assets, namely risk-free bonds and risky
equity shares. There is an unlimited supply of bonds, with risk-free rate of return
r > 0. The aggregate supply of equity shares is fixed at Q > 0. The return on
equity depends on its final price P˜1, which is normally distributed, and its initial
price P0, which is determined endogenously in our model.
Consider an arbitrary portfolio that allocates one unit of wealth across equity
and bonds. If it holds λ shares acquired at price P0 per share and invests the rest
in bonds, its value in the final period is λP˜1 + (1− λP0)r. It simplifies the analysis
if we express the value of the portfolio as a function of the excess return of equities
over bonds, K˜(P0) ≡ P˜1 − P0r. The value of the portfolio can then be written as
W˜ = λK˜ + r. (2)
Agents’ payoffs depend on portfolio choices. Fund managers are remunerated on the
basis of their absolute performance and their performance relative to other active
fund managers. Let W˜i be the final value of investor i’s holdings, whether direct or
delegated. DefineW = 1
n
∑n
i=1 W˜i to be the average final value of all professionally-
managed portfolios. The i−th fund manager’s remuneration is linear (or, to be
precise, affine)
R˜m(i) = Ii + aiW˜i + bi(W˜i −W ). (3)
Here Ii ≥ 0 is a fixed component, independent of the fund’s performance. The
coefficient ai ≥ 0 ties remuneration to the absolute performance of the fund and
bi ≥ 0 ties it to its relative performance. Note that relative performance is mea-
sured in relation to the performance of active fund managers, rather than to the
market as a whole or to any other pre-specified benchmark. Using the average
performance of active fund managers as the benchmark creates the possibility of
strategic interaction in fund managers’ choice.
The return to delegating investor i is the value of the delegated portfolio net of
the manager’s remuneration
R˜d(i) = W˜i − R˜m(i). (4)
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The contract parameters, (Ii, ai, bi), determine the division of the final portfolio
value between fund managers and delegating investors. In our model delegating
investors choose these parameters to align the interests of their fund manager with
their own objectives. Delegation contracts are subject to a participation constraint:
fund managers will accept a delegation contract only if the expected utility of the
contract is no less than their reservation utility. For simplicity, we assume that
all fund managers have the same reservation utility, φm ≥ 0; this is easily relaxed.
Thus, incentive compatibility and participation constraints will jointly affect the
choice of Ii, ai and bi.
Investors who invest directly on their own account obtain the full value of their
portfolio
R˜o(i) = W˜i. (5)
Investors may yet prefer costly delegation if they expect that fund managers can
make better-informed choices on their behalf. We describe this next.
2.2. Information Structure
All agents have a common prior distribution over the final price of the risky asset.
Prior to making the portfolio choice, but after entering any delegation contract,
each agent receives a signal. We assume that obtaining the signal incurs no cost
or effort: this allows us to abstract from any moral hazard in the problem. Fund
managers receive signals that are more informative than those received by investors.
An investor will choose to delegate if the informational advantage of fund managers
is strong enough to compensate for the cost of delegation. We develop this idea
in an environment in which all fund managers receive identical signals. Investors
receive signals that are less informative than those of fund managers, and their
precision varies across investors. It is natural to expect that investors with relatively
imprecise information will be more likely to delegate.
To formalise this, we assume that the prior distribution of the price of equity
in the final period is known by all to be
P˜1 = P¯1 + ε˜, where ε˜ ∼ N(0, σ2ε).
Before making their portfolio choices, fund managers observe a common signal s˜
s˜ = ε˜+ u˜, where u˜ ∼ N(0, σ2m), and E(ε˜u˜) = 0.
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Define αm ≡ σ2mσ2ε+σ2m ; this reflects the noise or imprecision of the signal. Its value
lies between 0 and 1, with lower values indicating a more informative set of signals.
Together, αm and S˜ specify the common information structure of all fund managers.
It is straightforward to show that, conditional on receiving a signal s˜, the posterior
distribution of P˜1 has mean and variance
E[P˜1|s˜] = P¯1 + (1− αm)s˜, (6)
V ar(P˜1|s˜) = αmσ2ε . (7)
Investors have heterogeneous information structures. Investor i gets a signal z˜i
z˜i = ε˜+ v˜i, where v˜i ∼ N(0, σ2i ) and E(ε˜v˜i) = 0.
Define αi =
σ2i
σ2ε+σ
2
i
to reflect the imprecision of investor i’s signal. Together with
the set of signals Z˜i, it defines the information structure for investor i. Conditional
on signal z˜i, the posterior distribution has mean and variance
E[P˜1|z˜i] = P¯1 + (1− αi)z˜i, (8)
V ar(P˜1|z˜i) = αiσ2ε . (9)
We assume that σ2m < σ
2
i for all i. It follows directly that αm < αi. This assumption
captures the reasonable idea that professional managers are better informed than
individual investors. Without this assumption there would be no role for active
fund management in our model.
2.3. Equilibrium
Given this structure, an asset market equilibrium can be defined in the usual fash-
ion. We assume that investors know the distributional properties of fund managers’
risk preferences and information. Investors choose whether or not to delegate, and
if they delegate, the parameters of their delegation contract. Fund managers choose
portfolios that maximise the expected utility of their remuneration. Direct investors
choose their portfolios to maximise expected utility.
Let λ ≡ (λ1, λ2, . . . , λN)′ be the vector of demand for equity, direct or via
delegated portfolios, for the N investors. Demand depends on the initial price P0.
Given the aggregate demand for equity shares and their fixed aggregate supply Q,
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the price, P0, is determined through market clearing:
N∑
i=1
λi(P0) = Q. (10)
The equilibrium outcome is subject to the familiar problem of information rev-
elation: investors may be able to infer information received by fund managers from
the equilibrium price. This problem can be addressed by allowing Q to be random
with a sufficiently large variance to make inference from prices very difficult. Such
randomness in Q might reflect the impact of liquidity traders. Ignoring the issue
here simplifies the algebra without significantly affecting our results.
To analyse the model, we first examine the investment choices of direct investors
and fund managers. We then consider the design of optimal remuneration contracts
and optimal delegation. Finally we study the equilibria in some sample economies.
3. Direct Investment
We begin by examining the portfolio choices of investors who invest on their own
account. The return to direct investment is given by
R˜o(i) = λK˜ + r. (11)
For any P0, let K¯(P0) ≡ E[K˜(P0)] = P¯1−P0r be the mean value of excess returns,
or the equity risk premium. We have the following result:
Proposition 1 Consider an investor i with coefficient of absolute risk aversion ρi
and information structure (αi, Z˜i). If this investor chooses to invest directly, the
optimal portfolio demand conditional on receiving signal z˜i is
λ∗o(i) =
K¯ + (1− αi)z˜i
ρiαiσ2ε
. (12)
The ex-ante expected utility of direct investment is
Vo(i) =
K¯2 + (1− αi)σ2ε
2ρiαiσ2ε
+ r. (13)
The demand for equity is standard for the assumed mean-variance structure of
preferences. Equity holding is increasing in K¯ + (1− αi)z˜i, which is the expected
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value of K˜ conditional on signal z˜i. Demand is decreasing in the risk aversion
parameter ρi and in the conditional variance αiσ
2
ε . Note that we have not ruled out
short sales as these do not affect our results in any significant way. The expression
for ex-ante expected utility of direct investment obtains by computing the expected
utility for each signal and then aggregating across Z˜i, the set of signals.
4. Delegation
We analyse delegation in three steps. First, we consider a fund manager’s portfolio
choice for an arbitrary remuneration contract. Next we compute the value of a
delegation contract to the delegating investor, allowing us to address the choice
of optimal contract parameters. We can then consider the delegation decision by
comparing the value of the optimally-chosen delegation contract with the value
of direct investment. For tractability we assume that all fund managers have the
same degree of risk aversion, ρm.
4.1. Manager’s choice conditional on signal s
Given a contract (Ii, ai, bi), a fund manager chooses the portfolio to maximise
expected utility of remuneration, R˜m(i). Relative performance evaluation makes
each manager’s remuneration sensitive to contracts of rival fund managers. To
capture this dependence, we define C =
n∑
j=1
1
(aj+bj)
, and D =
n∑
j=1
aj
(aj+bj)
.4 We have
the following result:
Lemma 1 Consider a fund manager with risk aversion ρm, information structure
(αm, S˜), and remuneration contract (Ii, ai, bi). Conditional on receiving a signal s˜,
his optimal portfolio demand is
λm(i) =
[
D + biC
D(ai + bi)
] [
K¯ + (1− αm)s˜
ρmαmσ2ε
]
. (14)
The ex-ante expected utility of a delegation contract to the fund manager is
Vm(i) = Ii + air +
K¯2 + (1− αm)σ2ε
2ρmαmσ2ε
. (15)
4The arguments that follow assume that aj > 0 for at least one delegating investor. This
ensures that D > 0. In the absence of this assumption, it can be shown that the equilibrium risk
premium is necessarily zero; if so, costly delegation is not rational.
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As with direct investment, the fund manager’s equity holding is increasing in
the conditional mean of K˜, and is decreasing in its conditional variance and in ρm.
Further, demand for equity differs across fund managers according to differences
in the (relative) weights on relative versus absolute performance in their contracts
(i.e., as bi/ai differs). If we define λm =
1
n
∑n
j=1 λm(j) as the average equity holding
in delegated portfolios, we have
λ
∗
m(s˜) =
C
D
[
K¯ + (1− αm)s˜
ρmαmσ2ε
]
. (16)
Lemma 1 also computes the value of the contract to the fund manager by ag-
gregating the expected utility of signal-contingent choices. As we might expect,
the fund manager’s expected utility is increasing in ai and Ii. Quite remarkably,
the value of the linear contract to the fund manager does not depend directly on
the relative performance parameter bi.
5 To understand this, note that while fund
managers’ portfolio choices are sensitive to RPE, the incentive effects of changing
bi are undone by the changes in the portfolio chosen by the fund manager. This
conclusion echoes similar findings in Stoughton (1993) and Admati and Pfleiderer
(1997). Indeed, while Lemma 1 establishes this for the mean-variance utility func-
tion entertained here, the result is valid for any concave utility function that fund
managers might have.
4.2. The return to delegated investment and optimal delegation contracts
The return to delegated investment is the value of the portfolio net of the man-
ager’s remuneration: R˜d(i) = W˜i− R˜m(i). It depends on the remuneration contract
parameters and the associated portfolio choices made by the fund manager. As the
latter may depend on rival fund managers’ contracts, so would the net return from
delegation. The value of a delegation contract to the delegating investor is given
by the following Lemma. For ease of notation, we define Mi =
D(1−ai−bi)+biC
(ai+bi)D
.
Lemma 2 Consider an investor with risk aversion ρi who delegates investment
to a fund manager with risk aversion ρm using a contract (Ii, ai, bi). The ex-ante
5The parameter bi, along with the contract parameters of rival fund managers, may affect the
fund manager’s utility through the equilibrium value of K¯, but this effect is indirect.
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expected utility of the net return to the delegating investor is
Vd(i)(Ii, ai, bi) = (1− ai)r − Ii +
[
K¯2 + (1− αm)σ2ε
ρmαmσ2ε
] [
1− ρi
2ρm
Mi
]
Mi. (17)
Each delegating investor chooses the contract parameters to maximise Vd(i). Of
course, a fund manager will willingly accept a remuneration contract only if the
expected value of the contract, Vm(i), exceeds his reservation utility φm. Thus, each
delegating investor must choose (ai, bi, Ii) to maximise Vd(i), subject to the following
participation constraint
Ii + air +
K¯2 + (1− αm)σ2ε
2ρmαmσ2ε
≥ φm, (18)
and the conditions that ai ≥ 0, bi ≥ 0, and Ii ≥ 0.
Note that the objective function, Vd(i), depends on the contract parameters Ii
and ai directly, and on bi through the term Mi . The participation constraint de-
pends only on Ii and ai. The existence of a lower bound on Ii creates the possibility
that the participation constraint may not bind, say, for φm small enough. Indeed,
since Ii has no influence on portfolio choice, optimal contracts will assign it the low-
est possible value when the participation constraint does not bind. The following
Lemma describes the structure of the optimal contract.
Lemma 3 Consider an investor with risk aversion ρi choosing a contract (Ii, ai, bi)
to delegate the investment decision to a fund manager with risk aversion ρm:
(i) If the participation constraint binds, the optimal contract chooses ai and bi so
that Mi =
ρm
ρi
and Ii is set so that the participation constraint just binds.
(ii) If the participation constraint does not bind, the optimal contract sets Ii = 0,
ai = D/C, and bi satisfies
K¯2 + (1− αm)σ2ε
ρmαmσ2ε
(
ρi
ρm
1− ai
ai
− 1
)(
1
ai
)(
1
ai + bi
)
= r. (19)
Lemma 3 shows that when the participation constraint binds, the optimal Mi
aligns the fund manager’s choices to the risk preferences of the delegating investor
– specifically, it corrects for any divergence between ρi and ρm – while the choice
of Ii > 0 ensures that the participation constraint is satisfied. Since Mi depends
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on both ai and bi, the optimality condition does not determine these parameters
uniquely. The relationship between optimal ai and bi is complicated.
6 As we shall
see, under a binding participation constraint relative performance evaluation does
not serve any essential purpose: any outcome achieved by positive values of bi can
be replicated by a suitable choice of ai.
When the participation constraint does not bind, the restriction that Ii be non-
negative imposes a binding constraint on the contract. The unconstrained optimum
would have chosen a negative value for Ii, but the non-negativity constraint makes
that choice inadmissible. The participation constraint does not bind here because
the constraint Ii ≥ 0 does. To understand the properties of this constrained opti-
mum, let (aˆi, bˆi) denote a solution to equation (19) for a given K¯. The requirement
that aˆi = D/C implies that the optimal weight on absolute performance is the
same for all delegation contracts that are constrained-optimal. Any heterogeneity
in delegating investors’ risk preferences ρi must then be accommodated through
differences in the choice of bˆi. Also, while D/C (and hence, aˆi) may be fixed from
a single investor’s perspective, the restrictions on the optimal contract are com-
patible with multiple solutions (aˆi, bˆi), corresponding to different values for D/C.
Lastly, it follows from equation (19), that bˆi is decreasing in aˆi: optimal contracts
that place greater emphasis on absolute performance place lower weight on relative
performance.7
Proposition 2 examines the implications of these contract structures for fund
managers’ portfolio choices.
Proposition 2 Consider an investor with risk aversion ρi who delegates the in-
vestment to a fund manager with risk aversion ρm using optimally-chosen contract
parameters. The optimal portfolio choice of the fund manager is
λ∗m(i) =
(
1
ρi
+
1
ρm
)[
K¯ + (1− αm)s˜
αmσ2ε
]
(20)
if the participation constraint binds, and
λ∗m(i) =
1
aˆi
1
ρm
[
K¯ + (1− αm)s˜
αmσ2ε
]
= λ
∗
m (21)
6It can be shown that, if the participation constraint binds for all delegating investors, the
optimal ai is increasing (decreasing) in bi for investors whose risk aversion is above (below) the
average for all delegating investors.
7To see why, note that for (19) to hold at r > 0, ai > 0, and bi ≥ 0, we must have ρiρm 1−aiai −1 >
0. Evaluating ∂bi∂ai for this range of values proves the claim.
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if the participation constraint does not bind. Demand is higher when the participa-
tion constraint does not bind.
Proposition 2 shows how constraints in the design of optimal delegation con-
tracts affect portfolio choice under delegation. When participation constraints for
fund managers bind, equation (20) shows that demand for equity in delegated port-
folios depends, ultimately, on the risk aversion of the delegating investor and the
fund manager. The choice of performance parameters does not really matter here
because all combinations of ai and bi that are consistent with optimality lead to the
same level of demand. The effect of delegation on the willingness to hold the risky
asset is easy to see. Delegation allows better-informed fund managers to choose
on behalf of less-informed investors, effectively expanding the information held by
the average market participant. Recall that, for simplicity, we have assumed that
managers have no investment resources of their own, so that here delegation also
increases the population of individuals willing to hold the risky asset, directly or
indirectly.8
When the participation constraint does not bind (i.e., a binding non-negativity
constraint on Ii makes the delegation contracts only constrained-optimal), vary-
ing the performance parameters does affect the demand for equity. Here increased
weight on relative performance (i.e., a higher value of bˆi) implies lower weight on
absolute performance (as aˆi must fall to maintain constrained-optimality). Equa-
tion (21) shows demand for equity to be decreasing in aˆi; thus, demand increases
as the weight on relative performance increases. Further, as the last part of Propo-
sition 2 shows, demand for equity is higher when the delegation contract is only
constrained-optimal: here delegation increases demand for equity beyond that sug-
gested by its information-enhancing feature. This, as we see later, has marked
implications for the equilibrium equity premium.
The two cases also differ in the pattern of equity holdings across investors. With
optimal linear contracts, heterogeneity in delegating investors’ risk aversion will
lead to heterogeneity in portfolio holdings. While RPE creates a general tendency
8Even when fund managers have some wealth of their own, delegation would increase the
willingness to hold the risky asset: equity in delegated portfolios would be the sum of what fund
managers would hold on their own account and what direct investors would have held if they
were as well informed as fund managers.
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to herd, the optimal choice of contract parameters re-aligns fund managers’ choices
to investors’ preferences, mitigating the tendency. In contrast, constrained-optimal
contracts display identical aˆi inducing fund managers to herd: with similar risk
aversion and information as assumed here, they hold identical portfolios.
The tendency to herd in the presence of RPE-based contracts has been noted
extensively in the literature, both empirical and theoretical. Empirical evidence
reported by Thomas and Tonks (2000) suggests that UK pension funds are “closet”
trackers. They found similar patterns of returns in a large sample of more than
2000 segregated UK pension funds. At the theoretical level, Maug and Naik (1996)
model a situation in which RPE contracts can induce fund managers to ignore
their own superior information. Herding may also be the consequence of strategic
interaction (Eichberger et al (1999)), to protect loss of reputation (Scharfstein and
Stein (1990)), or due to free-riding in the information acquisition process. Our
model abstracts from heterogeneity in information among fund managers. In our
setting, herding is a consequence of potential constraints in optimal contract design.
4.3. The delegation decision
Delegation is rational for an investor if and only if utility from the optimal dele-
gation contract exceeds the value of direct investment. To assess this, we begin by
evaluating the utility of the optimal delegation contract for delegating investors.
Proposition 3 Consider an investor with coefficient of risk aversion ρi who dele-
gates the investment to a fund manager with risk aversion ρm and reservation utility
φm. If the participation constraint binds, the ex-ante expected utility of return to
delegated investment equals
Vd(i) =
(
1
ρi
+
1
ρm
)[
K¯2 + (1− αm)σ2ε
2αmσ2ε
]
+ r − φm. (22)
If the participation constraint does not bind the ex-ante expected utility is
Vd(i) =
1
ρm
1− aˆi
aˆi
[
1− ρi
2ρm
1− aˆi
aˆi
] [
K¯2 + (1− αm)σ2ε
αmσ2ε
]
+ (1− aˆi)r. (23)
Propositions 1 and 3 allow us to describe the condition for rational delegation,
by comparing Vd(i) with Vo(i). It aids intuition to express the condition in terms of
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‘risk tolerances’ – the inverse of the coefficients of risk aversion – so that we write
τi =
1
ρi
and τm =
1
ρm
. Comparing (13) and (22), for the case where the participation
constraint binds, rational delegation requires
(τi + τm)
[
K¯2 + (1− αm)σ2ε
2αmσ2ε
]
+ r − φm ≥ τi
[
K¯2 + (1− αi)σ2ε
2αiσ2ε
]
+ r ,
or equivalently
K¯2 + σ2ε
2σ2ε
[
τi
αm
− τi
αi
+
τm
αm
]
≥ φm + τm
2
. (24)
Since αm < αi, the left hand side is positive, so delegation is rational if φm is not
too large. Further, the gain from delegation is higher for investors with noisier
signals (i.e., greater αi) and those with greater risk tolerance (higher τi). Lastly,
the gain from delegation is increasing in K¯: other things being the same, higher
values of the equilibrium risk premium will support greater delegation.9 We turn
next to the determination of this premium.10
5. Equilibrium
Asset market equilibrium requires that aggregate demand for equity equal the
supply, Q. Aggregate demand includes demand from direct investors and demand
from delegated portfolios, which are both functions of the equity premium, K¯(P0).
The equity premium also affects the extent of delegation: given that the number
9Similarly, we could compare (13) and (23) to obtain a condition for rational delegation when
the participation constraint does not bind. The delegation condition simplifies to
τm
αm
[
K¯2 + σ2ε
2σ2ε
− αm
2
] [
2− τm
τi
1− aˆi
aˆi
]
1− aˆi
aˆi
≥ τi
αi
[
K¯2 + σ2ε
2σ2ε
− αi
2
]
+ aˆir.
Once again the incentive to delegate is higher for investors with noisier signals and greater risk
tolerance.
10Our model ignores the possibility of partial delegation. When binding non-negativity con-
straints restrict delegating investors to choosing constrained-optimal contracts, delegating only
part of their wealth may allow them to circumvent the binding non-negativity constraint, at least
for some parameter configurations. However, the gain from moving to fully optimal contracts
for the delegated part of the investment must be traded against the inefficiency of investing the
rest directly, with inferior information, so that it will not in general be optimal to circumvent the
non-negativity constraint entirely. Our model can be extended to incorporate this, losing some
simplicity in the process, and without affecting the qualitative arguments. See also the related
discussion on ‘coordination’ in Admati and Pfleiderer (1997).
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of delegating investors is denoted by n, we have n = n(K¯). The market clearing
condition is
n(K)∑
i=1
λ∗m(i)(K¯) +
N∑
i=n(K)+1
λ∗o(i)(K¯) = Q. (25)
As demand is sensitive to the signals received by investors and fund managers,
it is possible that the market does not clear for very extreme realizations of the
signals.11 We discuss the issue of existence for the case where signals take values
that are not too extreme.
While the two categories of demand – direct and delegated – are both increasing
and continuous in K¯ , they differ in levels. We know, from Propositions 1 and 2,
that direct investment portfolios hold
λ∗o(i) =
1
ρi
[
K¯ + (1− αi)z˜i
αiσ2ε
]
,
while optimally delegated portfolios hold
λ∗m(i) =
(
1
ρi
+
1
ρm
)[
K¯ + (1− αm)s˜
αmσ2ε
]
when the participation constraint binds. Since αi > αm and ρm > 0, it follows
that as long as the conditional equity premium is positive, delegated portfolios hold
more equity than the corresponding direct investment portfolios for similar signals
(i.e., for s˜ ≈ z˜i). If the participation constraint does not bind, equity holdings
are even larger. Thus, at values of K¯ for which an investor is indifferent between
direct and delegated investment, the individual’s demand for equity has two distinct
solutions: we have a demand correspondence rather than a demand function. In
effect, there is a discontinuity in the demand associated with an individual investor,
as he switches from direct to delegated investment. Note, however, that the value
of K¯ at which this discontinuity occurs depends on the individual’s risk preference
and information structure (specifically, on ρi and αi). If the distribution of these
parameters is sufficiently dispersed across the population, the limit average demand
may be a continuous function even when individual demand is a correspondence.
11If s˜ z˜i, delegated portfolios may hold less than direct investment portfolios, so that greater
delegation at higher K¯ could potentially lower aggregate demand. However, if investors’ signals
are noisier versions of the managers’ signals, by the law of large numbers the mean value of the
investors’ signals would coincide with s˜.
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This is because at any K¯ only a vanishingly small proportion of investors display
indifference between delegation and direct investment.12
Aggregate demand is clearly increasing in K¯: each category of demand is in-
creasing in K¯, and the extent of delegation n(K¯) is increasing in K¯, so that higher
values of K¯ place greater weight on higher levels of demand. If aggregate demand
is monotone and ‘almost continuous’, an equilibrium will exist as long as demand
varies sufficiently along the set of feasible prices. If aggregate demand is less than
Q when K¯ = 0, and larger than Q when K¯ is very large, an equilibrium exists.
For sufficiently low values of K¯, aggregate demand for the risky asset is arbitrarily
small, at least for signals close to the average. The largest value K¯ = P 1 − P0r
can take (assuming P0 is non-negative) is P 1. We assume that aggregate demand
for the risky asset exceeds its supply Q at this price. Then the usual fixed point
arguments can establish the existence of a unique equilibrium.
5.1. Implications for the equity risk premium
The finding that delegated portfolios have larger holdings of the risky asset has
direct implications for the equity risk premium. Parameter changes that affect the
extent of delegation will alter the equilibrium premium. For instance, an improve-
ment in the precision of fund managers’ signals relative to that of investors’ signals
increases the incentive to delegate. Given that delegated portfolios have compara-
tively higher demand for equity, this change will be associated with a lower equity
risk premium at the equilibrium.13 Example 1 below illustrates this effect.
12Heterogeneity is not essential as a standard convexification argument for aggregate demand
can be applied instead. Suppose that at some K, each investor is indifferent between direct
investment and delegation, so that his demand takes one of two distinct values, λx(i)(K) ∈
{λo(i)(K), λm(i)(K)}. Suppose there are n investors: if we place n1 ≤ n investors at λo(i)(K) and
the rest at λm(i)(K), average demand is
λ =
n1
n
λo(i) +
(
1− n1
n
)
λm(i).
As n → ∞, average demand λ(K) fills the entire segment between λo(i)(K) and λm(i)(K) by
varying n1. This, in effect, makes aggregate demand continuous even when individual demand is
not.
13The finding that better information raises prices through a reduction in the riskiness of asset
payoffs has – in the context of firm spinoffs – also been pointed out by Habib, Johnsen and Naik
(1997). Here we show how this leads to lower equilibrium risk premia.
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Apart from the effect through changing delegation levels, the equity premium
may depend on the structure of delegation contracts. When investors can choose
the contract optimally, demand for equity, and hence the equilibrium equity pre-
mium, does not depend on the contract parameters. However, there is a real possi-
bility that non-negativity constraints on Ii may restrict the feasible set of contracts.
The prevalence of actual contracts based purely on performance (i.e., those with
no performance-independent component) lend some plausibility to this possibility.
When contracts are only constrained-optimal, the choice of contract parameters
matters. Lemma 3 tells us that for this case the problem of designing optimal
delegation contracts admits multiple solutions (aˆi, bˆi). Further, aˆi is decreasing in
bˆi and demand for equity is decreasing in aˆi. Thus, optimal contracts that place
greater emphasis on relative performance evaluation (and correspondingly less on
absolute performance) lead to greater demand for equity. For a fixed supply of
equity shares, this greater emphasis on RPE will lead to lower equity premia at
the equilibrium. Example 2 below demonstrates this for a simple case.
The preceding argument can be summarised thus:
Proposition 4 Consider the equity market equilibrium given by equation (25).
An increase in the weight on relative performance evaluation does not affect the
equilibrium equity premium when investors can choose the linear delegation contract
optimally. However, with constrained-optimal contracts, an increase in relative
performance evaluation tends to reduce the equity premium.
Our model suggests that higher levels of delegation may result in a decline in
the equilibrium risk premium. Empirical evidence (see Claus and Thomas (2001),
Fama and French (2002), and the surveys by Welch (2000), Graham and Harvey
(2001)) have discussed the possibility that the equity risk premium has declined
in recent years. Our model offers a tentative and partial explanation of such a
tendency.
5.2. Some examples
We illustrate our arguments through some examples. These examples are meant
to demonstrate qualitatively the mechanisms operating in our model and not to
suggest their likely magnitude. We use a special case of the information structure
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described above: we assume that signals observed by investors are noisier versions
of the signal received by fund managers:
z˜i = s˜+ x˜i,
where x˜i ∼ N(0, σ2xi) and E(s˜x˜i) = 0.
For this case, αi =
σ2m+σ
2
xi
σ2ε+σ
2
m+σ
2
xi
. Note that, with this structure, fund managers’
signals are more precise than those of investors as long as σ2xi > 0. We compute
the equilibria assuming each agent receives the average signal, i.e., s˜ = 0, z˜i = 0.
5.2.1. Example 1
Consider, first, an example in which the equilibrium outcome involves binding
participation constraints for fund managers. Here investor i’s demand for equity is
λi =

τi+τm
αm
(
K
σ2ε
)
under delegated investment
τi
αi
(
K
σ2ε
)
under direct investment
.
Investors’ coefficients of risk aversion are important in two regards. First, they
determine the economy’s capacity for carrying risk and hence matter directly to
the risk premium. Second, together with the degree of informational asymmetry
across investors and fund managers, investors’ risk aversion determines whether
they choose to delegate (see equation (24)). Risk-tolerant and poorly-informed
investors are more likely to delegate than risk-averse, well-informed ones.
Consider the following numerical example. We assume that all investors and
fund managers have the same constant absolute risk aversion of 3.3 (i.e., τi = 0.3
for all i, and τm = 0.3) but differ in the precision of their signals. We set σ
2
ε = 0.04,
i.e. σε = 0.20, corresponding to market volatility of 20% – a level consistent with
typical annual volatility in the US stock market. Let the variance of the noise in the
fund manager’s signal be σ2m = 0.2 so the R
2 of a regression of returns on manager
information is 0.16, a value not out of line with empirical evidence on predictability
of stock returns. Assume that half the population of investors have relatively noisy
information given by σ2x1 = 0.6, while the rest have σ
2
x2
= 0.2, corresponding to R2–
values of 0.05 and 0.09, respectively. Without loss of generality, we set the average
number of shares per investor at 1. If the reservation utility of fund managers φm
is set at 0.075 in these units, type-1 investors choose to delegate, type-2 investors
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invest directly, and the equilibrium equity premium is K¯ = 0.076, or 7.6%. At this
premium, average equity holdings are 0.56 units for direct investors and 1.44 units
for fund managers.
It is easy to check that an increase in the extent of delegation would lower this
premium. If the fraction of investors with relatively imprecise information rises
to two-thirds, the equilibrium equity premium declines to 6.8%. This decline is
clearly a consequence of greater delegation: in a model without any delegation, an
increase in the average imprecision of information would raise the equity premium.
5.2.2. Example 2
In our second example the parameter values are such that all investors delegate
at the equilibrium and fund managers’ participation constraints do not bind. As
before, we set σ2ε = 0.04. Let σ
2
m = 0.12, σ
2
xi
= 0.6 for all investors and let τi = τm =
0.2. We set the interest rate r at 5% and reservation utility at φm = 0.04. When
participation constraints do not bind, the choice of optimal contract parameters is
given by equation (19). For any chosen value of bi, this equation along with the
market clearing equation can be solved for aˆi and K¯. In each case we check that
delegation is optimal and that the participation constraint is non-binding at the
equilibrium.
If we set bi = 0, the equilibrium equity premium is 7.1%. Increasing the weight
on relative performance to bi = 0.5 reduces the equity premium to 6.8%; raising it
further to bi = 0.9 reduces the equity premium to 6.5%. In this example, greater
emphasis on relative performance has definite implications for the equity premium.
5.2.3. Example 3
Introducing some heterogeneity among investors, so that not all delegate at the
equilibrium, can demonstrate larger reductions in the equity premium. Our third
example studies the effect of varying the proportion of delegating investors, once
again in an environment where participation constraint do not bind. As in example
2, we set σ2ε = 0.04, σ
2
m = 0.12, τm = 0.2, r = 0.05, φm = 0.04 and Q = 1. We
now assume that there are two groups of investors: the first have σ2x1 = 0.4 and
τ1 = 0.6, while the second group have σ
2
x2
= 0.2 and τ2 = 0.2. The first group of
investors, with relatively noisy signals and high risk tolerance, chooses to delegate
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while the second group ends up investing directly at the equilibrium. At the chosen
parameter values, this separation of choices – that the first group delegates while
the second group does not – holds for a wide range of values of the equity premium.
This is important because the equity premium varies considerably as the proportion
of the two groups is varied parametrically. We choose bi = 0.5 and solve for aˆi and
K¯ from the market-clearing condition and equation (19).
When the first group constitutes 30% of the population – corresponding to
relatively low levels of delegation – the equity premium is 8.05%. The premium
falls to 5.85% when the proportion of delegating investors is raised to 50%. Further
increasing this proportion to 80% leads to an equity premium of 4.12%, suggesting
that delegation has a sizeable effect on the mean return on the risky asset.
5.3. Allowing managers to have wealth: an extension
Our model and numerical simulations assume that fund managers have no wealth
of their own. The results can readily be adapted to accommodate this possibility.
Suppose there are N investors, each with one unit of wealth, and potentially N
fund managers each with q ≥ 0 units of wealth. Portfolio choice for the n delegating
investors is now made by fund managers who combine delegated funds with their
own funds to invest 1 + q units of wealth. A fund manager’s payoff now has two
components: delegation fees for the managed portfolio and a share of the portfolio
itself, in proportion to his private investment. The remaining N − n investors and
potential fund managers invest their own wealth directly.
Generalisation of the previous analysis leads to the following results. If del-
egation does not happen, holdings of the direct investors, λ∗o(i), and the private
holdings of potential fund managers, denoted as λ∗mo(i), evaluated at the expected
value of their signals, add up to
λ∗o(i) + λ
∗
mo(i) =
(
1
ρi
1
αi
+
1
ρm
1
αm
)
K¯
σ2ε
. (26)
Equity holdings in delegated portfolios, also evaluated at the expected value of the
managers’ signals, depend on whether the participation constraint binds:
λ∗m(i) =

(
1
ρi
+ 1
ρm
)
1
αm
K¯
σ2ε
if the participation constraint binds
1
ρm
(
1+q
aˆi+q
)
1
αm
K¯
σ2ε
if it does not
(27)
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In the latter case, delegation parameters must satisfy the following generalisation
of condition (19)
K¯2 + (1− αm)σ2ε
ρmαmσ2ε
(
ρi
ρm
1− ai
q + ai
− 1
)(
1 + q
ai + q
)(
1
q + ai + bi
)
= r.
The modified condition for rational delegation is straightforward to specify. The
market clearing equation is now written as
n∑
i=1
λ∗m(i) +
N∑
i=n+1
[
λ∗o(i) + λ
∗
mo(i)
]
= Q. (28)
We next examine the effect of this modification on our numerical results−in
particular on the relationship between delegation and the equilibrium equity pre-
mium. Let us reconsider Example 1, where delegation contracts involved binding
participation constraints. Comparing equations (26) and (27), we find that vari-
ations in the level of delegation now affect holdings of the risky asset only to the
extent that delegation allows managers to make more informed choices on behalf
of delegating investors. If so, higher levels of delegation still reduce the equilibrium
equity premium but the effect is less pronounced than in Example 1.
When participation constraints do not bind, as in Example 3, our finding that
delegation can lower the equilibrium equity premium is again robust. Recalibrating
Example 3 under the assumption that managers’ wealth equals 10% of investors’
wealth (that is, q = 0.1) and setting the relative performance parameter at bi = 0.5
we find that, as the proportion of delegating investors varies, say from 30% to 70%,
the equity premium falls from 5.8% to 4.2%. The reduction is not as dramatic as in
Example 3, but significant nonetheless. In general, if fund managers’ own wealth
is small relative to the delegated funds they receive, the impact of delegation on
their portfolio choices – and, hence, on the equity premium – is likely to be more
significant. Managers typically hold portfolios far greater than the value of their
own assets so that our assumed parameter values are not implausible.
Lastly, a simple thought experiment may help to further understand the role of
delegation contracts in the presence of manager wealth.
5.3.1. Example 4
We set the parameter values as in Example 3. We assume that half the population
consists of potential managers, each with q = 0.1 units of wealth. The other half
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consists of investors with one unit of wealth each: half the investors are type 1 and
the other half are type 2. We compute equilibrium risk premia corresponding to
three scenarios. In the first scenario money management is prohibited so that all
agents are forced to invest directly. We find that the risk premium would be 11.3%
for our chosen parameters. In the second scenario, we have delegation along the
lines discussed in Example 3: investors of type 1 delegate, while investors of type 2
(and fund managers without access to delegated funds) invest directly. This results
in a risk premium of 5.7%. The third scenario considers a hypothetical economy in
which investors of type 1 are given the fund manager’s information signal and then
trade on their own. In this scenario the risk premium would be 10.3%. Since the
information sets are equivalent in the latter two scenarios, comparing risk premia
in these scenarios helps us appreciate the extent to which the delegation contract
itself matters for the risk premium.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we aim to explore the equilibrium consequences of performance-based
contracts for fund managers. We consider an extremely simple model, with two
time periods and two assets. Investors can invest directly or delegate their port-
folio choice to better-informed fund managers. We examine linear remuneration
contracts, allowing fund managers’ remuneration to depend on the absolute per-
formance of funds and their performance relative to other actively-managed funds.
The structure of managers’ remuneration contracts is endogenously determined,
albeit within the restricted class of contracts that are linear in the performance
measures. At the equilibrium, the extent of investment delegation and the equity
premium are jointly determined. Characterizing the equilibrium in a model with
endogenous contracts is generally very complicated. Specializing the analysis to the
case where all agents have CARA utility functions allows us to solve explicitly for
the equilibrium and to investigate the dependence of the equilibrium risk premium
on the parameters of the remuneration contracts.
We find that delegation in and of itself has an effect on asset market equilibrium:
given that fund managers are better informed than investors, delegated portfolios
hold more risky assets than direct investment portfolios. Separately from this, the
structure of remuneration contracts – in particular the relative emphasis they place
on absolute versus relative performance – may affect the outcome. Whether or not
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it does critically depends on whether the chosen linear contract is fully-optimal
or only constrained-optimal. With fully-optimal contracts, portfolio choices are
independent of how the reward for performance is distributed between absolute
and relative performance. However, when the set of feasible contracts is restricted
– specifically, if the choice of the performance-independent component faces a
binding non-negativity constraint, so that the chosen contract is only constrained-
optimal – relative performance evaluation matters. One, it creates a tendency to
herd. Two, greater weight on relative performance implies a lower weight on abso-
lute performance, and as Example 2 illustrates, a lower equity premium. Example
4 shows that delegation has an effect on the equity premium beyond that due to
the difference in investors’ and fund managers’ information. That is, the equity
premium differs in an economy with delegation compared to one where direct in-
vestors were given the same information as fund managers. Our findings suggest
that more widespread use of delegation contracts and greater reliance on relative
performance evaluation could have contributed to the recently observed decline in
equilibrium equity premia.
Our model is quite simple, especially in how we model the agency relationship
between investors and fund managers. We focus the agency problem purely on
portfolio choice. The problem of designing optimal contracts could be augmented
to address issues of screening managers according to their innate ability, and pro-
viding incentives for them to exert effort to improve their information. We could
embellish the model by considering multiple risky assets.14 A more realistic model
would allow richer possibilities for matching investors to fund managers, includ-
ing the possibility that a manager may handle multiple funds, or that investors
may use multiple managers. Realistic concerns would also allow for an alterna-
tive specification where fund managers, rather than investors, choose the contract
structure, subject to investors’ participation. Manager-designed fund structures
could be concerned with the long-term rewards including those based on dynamics
14Our model suggests that delegation and RPE contracts lower the equilibrium risk premium.
In a model with multiple risky asset classes the risk premia of individual shares will be proportional
to their betas times the risk premium on the market portfolio. It is therefore natural to conjecture
that a narrowing would occur for the relative return performance of very risky and less risky assets.
Given the empirical difficulties encountered by the CAPM, it is difficult to say if this has occurred,
although there is some evidence that the relative return of small stocks (which are highly risky)
over that of large stocks (which generally are less risky) has been reduced in recent years.
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and character of future investment flows (see, for instance, Nanda et al (2000)).
More importantly, despite the appeal of symmetric contracts, it may be worth-
while to examine contracts other than linear ones. Das and Sundaram (2002)
describe a model in which asymmetric contracts may sometimes be superior from
the investors’ perspective. In a related context, Palomino and Prat (2003) find
that, in the presence of limited liability for fund managers, the optimal contract
may be a bonus contract. Lastly, there are puzzles that our model does not aim to
address: for instance, why investors choose costly delegation despite strong empir-
ical evidence that the average mutual fund underperforms passive investment. A
model addressing this and related questions would need to account for transaction
costs for direct and pooled investments which goes well beyond the scope of this
paper.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Direct investor i chooses λ to maximise expected utility
E[R˜o(i)]− ρi
2
V ar[R˜o(i)] = λE[K˜] + r − ρi
2
λ2V ar[K˜].
The optimal choice conditional on signal z˜i is, using (8) and (9),
λ∗o(i)(zi) =
E[K˜|z˜i]
ρiV ar[K˜|z˜i]
=
K¯ + (1− αi)z˜i
ρiαiσ2ε
.
Evaluating expected utility at this optimal portfolio, we get
λ∗o(i)E[K˜|z˜i] + r −
ρi
2
λ∗2o(i)V ar[K˜|z˜i =
1
2
(K¯ + (1− αi)z˜i)2
ρiαiσ2ε
+ r.
Aggregating this across the set of signals Z˜i and using the relation
E[(K + (1− αi)z˜i)2] = K¯2 + (1− αi)2V ar[z˜i]
= K¯2 + (1− αi)σ2ε
the ex-ante value of direct investment is
Vo(i) =
1
2
K¯2 + (1− αi)σ2ε
ρiαiσ2ε
+ r . 
Proof of Lemma 1: The manager of fund i maximizes E[R˜m(i)]− ρm2 V ar[R˜m(i)].
Define λm =
1
n
∑n
j=1 λm(j) as the average equity holding in delegated portfolios.
We can then write
R˜m(i) = Ii + air + [(ai + bi)λm(i) − biλm]K˜.
This has mean and variance
E[R˜m(i)] = Ii + air + [(ai + bi)λm(i) − biλm]E[K˜],
V ar[R˜m(i)] = [(ai + bi)λm(i) − biλm]2V ar[K˜].
Fund manager i’s demand for equity conditional on signal s˜ is, using (6) and (7),
λ∗m(i)(s˜) =
(
1
ai + bi
)
E[K˜|s˜]
ρmV ar[K˜|s˜]
+
(
bi
ai + bi
)
λm
=
(
1
ai + bi
)[
K¯ + (1− αm)s˜
ρmαmσ2ε
]
+
(
bi
ai + bi
)
λm.
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Aggregating demand across fund managers, we have
nλ
∗
m(s˜) =
[
K¯ + (1− αm)s˜
ρmαmσ2ε
] n∑
j=1
1
(aj + bj)
+ λ
∗
m(s˜)
n∑
j=1
bj
(aj + bj)
.
Simplifying, and using the defined notation C =
n∑
j=1
1
(aj+bj)
, and D =
n∑
j=1
aj
(aj+bj)
,
average holdings in delegated portfolios are
λ
∗
m(s˜) =
[
K¯ + (1− αm)s˜
ρmαmσ2ε
]
C
D
.
Substituting this in the expression for the optimal portfolio, we have
λ∗m(i)(s) =
[
D + biC
D(ai + bi)
] [
K¯ + (1− αm)s˜
ρmαmσ2ε
]
.
The conditional mean and variance of the manager’s remuneration at this optimal
portfolio are
E
[
R˜m(λ
∗
m(i)(s˜))
]
= Ii + air + [(ai + bi)λ
∗
m(i)(s˜)− biλ
∗
m(s˜)]E[K˜|s˜]
= Ii + air +
[K¯ + (1− αm)s˜]2
ρmαmσ2ε
,
V ar
[
R˜(λ∗m(i)(s˜))
]
=
[
(ai + bi)λ
∗
m(i)(s˜)− biλm(s˜)
]2
V ar[K˜|s˜]
=
[K¯ + (1− αm)s˜]2
ρ2mαmσ
2
ε
,
so that expected utility conditional on signal s˜ is
E
[
R˜m(λ
∗
m(i)(s˜))
]
− ρm
2
V ar
[
R˜(λ∗m(i)(s˜))
]
= Ii + air +
1
2ρm
(K¯ + (1− αm)s˜)2
αmσ2ε
.
Aggregating this across S˜, the ex-ante expected utility of the delegation contract
is
Vm(i) = Ii + air +
1
2ρmαmσ2ε
Es[(K¯ + (1− αm)s˜)2]
= Ii + air +
K¯2 + (1− αm)σ2ε
2ρmαmσ2ε
. 
Proof of Lemma 2: If fund manager i chooses λ∗m(s˜) in response to signal s˜, the
delegating investor’s net return is
R˜d(i) = W˜i − R˜m(i) =
[
(1− ai − bi)λ∗m(s˜) + biλ
∗
(s˜)
]
K˜ + (1− ai)r − Ii.
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Using (14) and (16), and the notation Mi =
D(1−ai−bi)+biC
(ai+bi)D
, we have
(1− ai − bi)λ∗m(s˜) + biλ
∗
(s˜) =Mi
[
K¯ + (1− αm)s˜
ρmαmσ2ε
]
,
so that the net return for the delegating investor is
R˜d(i) =Mi
[
K¯ + (1− αm)s˜
ρmαmσ2ε
]
K˜ + (1− ai)r − Ii,
with mean and variance
E[R˜d(i)|s˜] = Mi [K¯ + (1− αm)s˜]
2
ρmαmσ2ε
+ (1− ai)r − Ii,
V ar
[
R˜d(i)|s˜
]
=
M2i [K¯ + (1− αm)s˜]2
ρ2mαmσ
2
ε
.
The conditional expected utility equals
E[R˜d(i)|s˜]− ρi
2
V ar
[
R˜d(i)|s˜
]
= (1− ai)r − Ii + [K¯ + (1− αm)s˜]
2
ρ2mαmσ
2
ε
[
1− ρi
2ρm
Mi
]
Mi.
Taking expectations across the set of signals, we obtain the ex-ante expected utility
of the contract
Vd(i)(Ii, ai, bi) = (1− ai)r − Ii +
[
K¯2 + (1− αm)σ2ε
ρmαmσ2ε
] [
1− ρi
2ρm
Mi
]
Mi. 
Proof of Lemma 3: The delegating investor chooses Ii, ai and bi to maximise
(1− ai)r − Ii +
[
K¯2 + (1− αm)σ2ε
ρmαmσ2ε
] [
1− ρi
2ρm
Mi
]
Mi
subject to the participation constraint
Ii + air +
K¯2 + (1− αm)σ2ε
2ρmαmσ2ε
≥ φm
and the constraints that ai ≥ 0, bi ≥ 0 and Ii ≥ 0. Let L be the associated
Lagrangean and θ be the Lagrangean multiplier associated with the participation
constraint. The first-order conditions for the maximum are
∂L
∂ai
=
K¯2 + (1− αm)σ2ε
ρmαmσ2ε
(
1− ρi
ρm
Mi
)
∂Mi
∂ai
− r + θr ≤ 0
∂L
∂bi
=
K¯2 + (1− αm)σ2ε
ρmαmσ2ε
(
1− ρi
ρm
Mi
)
∂Mi
∂bi
≤ 0
∂L
∂Ii
= −1 + θ ≤ 0
∂L
∂θ
= Ii + air +
K¯2 + (1− αm)σ2ε
2ρmαmσ2ε
− φm ≥ 0
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with the caveat that, due to complementary slackness, an inequality holds as an
equality if the relevant variable ai, bi, Ii or θ is strictly positive. (The second-order
conditions have been verified but are tedious to report here).
For strictly positive Ii, the third relation holds as an equality. But then θ = 1,
which is strictly positive so that the participation constraint binds. Also, with
strictly positive ai, the first relationship holds as an equality, so that θ = 1 and
∂Mi
∂ai
= −(biC+D)
(ai+bi)2D
< 0 ensure that the optimal contract must have M∗i =
ρm
ρi
. The
same outcome obtains for any configuration in which bi is strictly positive.
If the participation constraint does not bind, we have θ = 0, and so Ii = 0. For
outcomes in which both ai and bi are strictly positive and r 6= 0, a solution exists
only if ∂Mi
∂bi
= aiC−D
(ai+bi)2D
= 0, so ai = D/C, and consequently Mi = (1−ai)/ai. Using
this in the first-order condition, we can solve for the relationship between optimal
bi and ai :
K¯2 + (1− αm)σ2ε
ρmαmσ2ε
(
1− ρi
ρm
1− ai
ai
)(−1
ai
)(
1
ai + bi
)
= r.
For outcomes in which only ai is positive, this relation can be solved for the optimal
ai, setting bi = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 2: From Lemma 1, fund manager i’s equity holdings are
λ∗m(i)(s˜) =
[
D + biC
D(ai + bi)
]
1
ρm
(
K¯ + (1− αm)s˜
αmσ2ε
)
.
If the participation constraint binds, the optimal contract has Mi =
D+biC
D(ai+bi)
− 1 =
ρm
ρi
, so that
λ∗m(i)(s˜) =
(
1
ρi
+
1
ρm
)(
K¯ + (1− αm)s˜
αmσ2ε
)
.
If the participation constraint does not bind, the optimally-chosen aˆi =
D
C
and
D+biC
D(ai+bi)
= 1
aˆi
, so
λ∗m(i)(s˜) =
[
1
aˆi
] [
K¯ + (1− αm)s˜
ρmαmσ2ε
]
= λ
∗
m(s˜)
Lastly, note that as ρi
ρm
1−aˆi
aˆi
− 1 must be positive to solve (19) for r > 0, aˆi > 0 and
bˆi ≥ 0, it follows that 1aˆi 1ρm > 1ρi + 1ρm . This implies that the constrained-optimal
delegation contracts lead to higher demand for equity than optimal delegation
contracts.
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Proof of Proposition 3: From Lemma 2, the expected utility of delegating
investors is
Vd(i)(Ii, ai, bi) = (1− ai)r − Ii +
[
K¯2 + (1− αm)σ2ε
ρmαmσ2ε
] [
1− ρi
2ρm
Mi
]
Mi.
When the participation constraint binds, Mi =
ρm
ρi
. Using this, and substituting
from the participation constraint, we get
Vd(i) =
1
2
(
1
ρi
+
1
ρm
)(
K2 + (1− αm)σ2ε
αmσ2ε
)
+ r − φm.
When the participation constraint does not bind, we have Ii = 0 and Mi =
1−aˆi
aˆi
.
Evaluating the above expression at these values yields the result 
Proof of Proposition 4: Follows directly from the arguments in the text. 
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